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In the last months of the Eisenhower Administration, Sam Raybwn of Texas,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, encountered growing opposition to reform
legislation. Sometimes called a populist, sometimes a liberal, and sometimes a
moderate-regaI'dless of classification, Rayburn in forty-six years of continuous service in
the House established a record for positive achievement, but in the Eighty-Sixth
Congress, which met in 1959, the Conunittee on Rules blocked the Democratic
legislative program even though the Democrats were in the majority.1 This opposition to
progressive legislation challenged the Speaker's long record of leadership.
lndeed, RaybmD had an impressive public career. Born in Roane County,
Tennessee; on January 6, 1882, he moved to Texas during his youth and received
his education at East Texas College at Commerce and The University of Texas Law
School at Austin. Taking an early interest in politics, the life-long Democrat was
elected to his first of three terms in the Texas House of Representatives in 1907.
He rapidly became influential in state politics, as amply demonstrated in 1911
when he was chosen Speaker of the House. He was first elected to the United
States Congress in 1913 and was thereafter continually reelected until his death in
1961. He represented the Fourth Congressional District, one that included Collin,
Fannin, Grayson, Hunt, Kaufman, Rains, and Rockwall counties. Establishing a
reputation as an able legislator, he not only represented the interests of his East
Texas constituents, he also gained influence in national Democratic circles. From
1931 to 1937 he chaired the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
After serving as Majority Leader from 1937 to 1940, he was elected Speaker of the
House and held that position unti.l1947 when the Democratic Party lost control of
the chamber. He was Minority Leader from 1947 until 1949, and from 1949 to
1953 he again served as Speaker. From 1953 to 1955 he served as Majority Leader,
and in 1955 he was once again elected Speaker, the position' he held until his
death)
It was during his last term as Speaker that the aforementioned Rules Committee
presented Rayburn with one of his greatest ·'tests." This committee was the most
powerful one in the House. Having original and secondary jurisdiciton over the agenda
of proposed legislation, it could stop most bills by refusing to advance them for
consideration before the House. It could even introduce its own bills. Without it, the
House would have had more bills than could have possibly been considered. The
primary function of the committee, then, was to prevent needless legislation from
reaching the floor, but by using broad powers in 1959 it blocked most bills and thus
controlled all legislation.3
Previously, when Raybrnn's personal friend Joseph W. Martin was Republican
Minority Leader, the Speaker carried out most Democratic programs without ~eat
difficulty by compromising with Martin. In the Eighty-sixth Congress, however, Charles
A. Halleck replaced Martin as Minority Leader. Halleck immediately established an
alliance with Howard W. Smith, the conservative Chairman of the Rules
Committee, and these two men successfully obstructed the Speaker's Democratic
~rogram.3 For Raybwn, the Virginia «Dixiecrat" Smith was a worthy opponent
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because as Chairman of the Rilles Committee he held the power to set its agenda, to
schedule -witnesses, or even to choose not to convene the Committee.4
Although the Rules Committee may consist of from five to Hfteen members, in
the years prior to 1959 it'> number was set at twelve. Traditionally, the majority party
in the House -controlled it with an 'eight to four advantage.S Accordingly, the
Democratic Party should have dominated it. Yet the Republicans gained control
becau~'e Chairman Smith and William M. Colmer, "Dixiecrat" from Mississippi, joined
the Republican committeemen and effectively blocked Democratic legi&lation.6
Rayburn tried to use personal influence to counteract this coalition but was
unsuccessful. He suffered many failures during the Eisenhower Administration.? As a
result, the Democratic Party failed to advance its program and almost split trying to
break the conservative alliance.
This situation became intolerable to the Speaker during the presidential and
congressional campaigns of 1960. The conservative coalition did everything in its
power to embarrass Democratic candidates-especiaDy John F. Kennedy, the Party's
nominee for President. During this period, Smith and Colmer, voting \\1th
Republicans, stopped liberal bills concerning minimum wages, aid to education, and
hOllsing..8 Rayburn and Kennedy duly blamed the conservatives. After the presidential
elections of 1960, the Speaker tlnally decided to react against the obstruction. He
believed in Kennedy's New Frontier and re~cd th<Jt ~() move the prol"Tam he had to
break this conservative hold on legislation. On December 20. 1960 Rayburn met
with the President-elect at Palm Springs, ,Honda, to discuss the prulJlell1. Kennedy
gave the Speaker his full support as well as assurance that he would not interfere with
House business. -They de<..'ided that Rayburn should take personal control of the
situation and handle the problem in his own way.l0
The Speaker considered three alternative actions which might break the coaltion
on the Committee. First, he might try to get a Twenty-one-Day Rule. But this would
let all legislation out of the Committee if the coalition held it longer than tluee
weeks, and as a result, much needless legislation might reach the floor. lt
Consequently, Rayburn decided against the first alternative. Second, the Speaker
might attempt to remove a member. Moderate Democratic leaders thought this would
be most desirable. Both Representative John A. Blatnik, an influential Democrat from
Minnesota, and Vice President-elect Lyndon B. Johnson urged Rayburn to "purge"
William M. Colmer)2 They wanted to keep the problem within the party and a
"purge" would accomplish this purpose. Blatnik and Johnson maintained that
Rayburn could simply replace Colmer with a moderate or liberal Democrat. 13 The
New Frontier would then have a seven to nyC majority on the committee, and
Republican participation regarding the problem could be avoided. The Speaker feared,
however, that this course could have dire comequences. Although he had adequate
grounds for Colmer's removal-Colmer had opposed Kennedy in the presidential
campaign-southerners might have considered such a move an attempt to advance
Kenndey's civil ri~hts program. They might have bolted and caused dissension in the
party. TIlls Rayburn did not want. Rather, he hoped to unify the Democratic Party
and effect good legislation. Accordingly, he decided upon a third alternative; he would
move to enlarge the committee)4 By increasing the membership from twelve to
fifteen, the moderates on the Rules Committee would enjoy an eight to seven
advantage. Moreover, the enlargement plan was not as harsh as the removal plan. -',":
Rayburn knew that moderate and progressive Southern Democrats would favor it as a';
conciliatory measure, a move that might unite the party.
When the Eighty-seventh Congress convened January 3, 1961, the Speaker could
have begun enlargement preceedings, but a struggle then would have created a bad
..
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image of the forthcoming Kennedy Administration, and a defeat would have ruined
the New Frontier's chance of success. Rayburn, therefore, .refused to commit himself
publicly on the first day. He allowed the House to adopt the rules of the Eighty~sixth
Congress without challenge. This meant that the resolution to change the Rules
Committee would have to have approval from the conservative coalition which
controlled it; otherwise, the enlargement proposal would not reach the floor)5
This failure to act on the fust day necessitated oblique tactics on Rayburn's part.
He pretended he might effect Coliner's removaL The rumOI of removal circulating in
the country's leading neWSpapers made excellent psychological warfare. It brought
confusion among "his opponents. 16 Delay also afforded the Speaker opportunity to
amass support, and various factions both in and out of Congress gave him aid. For
example, the Democratic Study Group, a unit of about one hundred liberal
Democrats, which ha4 organized in 1956 because of the tactical successes of the
conservatives, cucu1ated pamphlets identifying the sweeping powers of the Rules
Committee and giving alternate proposals for reforms) 7 Also, Richard Bolling, the
liberal Democratic leader on the Rules Committee, used his influence to help Rayburn
get enlargement-vote pledges. The Speaker- remembering the December, 1960,
meeting with Kennedy-asked for the President's assistance and got it; Kenne~y and
his staff made personal calls on doubtful congre~mcn)8 The new administration's
control over public works projects, over job patronage, and over cummittee
appointments influenced many)9 Finally, various organizations throughout the
country expressed approval of the Speaker's poKiton. For example, Rayburn received a
statement from the Conference on Majority Rule in Congress. This Conference was
called to discuss the Rules Committee problem. Of the forty-five organizations
participating in the meeting, the most prominent were the AFL-CIO, the American
Association of University Women, the National Education Association, and the League
of Women Voters. The conferencc's statement favored a Rules Committee change and
concluded that it was the fundamental right of the majority to rule and that the
conservative blockade. violated this princiPle.20
Of course, Rayburn's most valuable asset was his own influence. All congressmen,
even his opponents, respected "Mr. Speaker." His power rested on friendships made in
many years of service. He had extended courtesies to all members of the House; many
owed him political favors. And when personal influence failed, Rayburn resorted to
his official prerogatives as Speaker of the House, most important of Which Was the
power to influence committee assi!,'llments.21
As Rayburn gathered support, new events concerning enlargement occurred in
rapid succession. From January 3 to January 11 the Speaker was in constant contact
with Smith, and the two men tried to effect a compromise. The Speaker considered
maintaining the status quo on the Rules Committee if Smith would promise to give all
of the Kennedy's major proposals permission to go to the floor. They reached no
agIecment, and on January 11 Rayburn publicly annoum,-ed his support of the
enlargement plan.22 Although many liberals still favored Colmer's removal, and
perhaps Smith's also,' the Speaker still refused to confront the Southern Democrats
duectly .
The Tlllal stage for the struggle was set when, on January 24, the Rilles
Committee gave the enlargement proposal a rule for debate.24 Because the Republican
caucus had voted to oppose Rayburn, Smith did not attempt to stop the resollition.
He believed the Republican- Dixiecrat coalition would defeat the Speaker. Moreover...
had Smith refused' a d'ebate rulc, Rayburn could have still effected Colmer's removal)J
The House scheduled the vote on enlargement for Thursday, January 26. But Rayburn
lacked confidence. His personal prestige was at stake, and a defeat would have placed
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him and the entire Kennedy Administration at the mercy of the Rules Committee.
Fearing defeat, the Speaker appealed to moderate Republicans for support. Then,
because ·he knew Smith and Halleck possibly had enough support to stop the
resolution, he postponed the vote until Tuesday, January 31.26 ..
Throughout the struggle the Speaker had had an additional problem. His Texas
colleagues in the House reported mail increases from their constituents. Most of the
people writing doubted the wisdom of enlarging the Rules Committee.27
Rayburn. however. was sure that these letters, along with the ones he personally
received, "were from people who voted for Nixon and were poor losers who still
wanted to f"lght Kenncdy.',28 Consequently, in spite of the possibility of losing local
support in Texas, Rayburn decided to continue his opposition to the Rules
Committee. Fifteen members of the Texas delegation, including Homer Thornberry,.'a
Democrat and a member of the Rules Committee, suppOIted the Speaker while seven
opposed,29
During the final week the Speakcr's forces gained support. Smith, now afraid of
losing his power base, offered a compromise. He said his committee would permit the
five major bills in Kennedy's program to go before the House,including biUs for
redevelopment of depressed areas, housing, higher minimum wagcs, health insumnce of
the aged, and federal aid to public schools,30 On January 28, Rayburn-in close
communication with President Kennedy-rejected the offcr. These five proposals would
not complete the Demm.'Tatic program. Stating that the New Frontier would includc
ten or twelve major proposals-, the President supported Rayburn's refusaL3l
Because of Rayburn and Smith's failure to reach a compromise, the House met
on January 31, 1961 to consider Resolution 127, the enlargement plan. After
Rayburn supporters expressed their views, the Speaker made one of his rare speeches
on the floor and gave his reasons for wanting the Rules Committee enlarged. For one
thing, he said, the n~tion needed good legislation. Also, the House needed the
authority to consider all important bills. He supported the New Fronticr and wanted
to "move the -programo "32 He did not believe one committee deserved the power to
stop alllef,islation.33
When the moment for the vote arrived, congressman and spectators were silent.
The last five yates decided the victor. The Speaker's plan won House approval by the
narrow margin of 217 to 212.34 Thus, the Rayburn-led moderate Democrats broke
Smith's control over the Rules Committee and assured consideration of Kennedy's
programs. Later, the Speaker said this was his greatest per:'>onaJ victory. His pre:'>tige
and power were intact, and after the fmal roll call, House members gave him a
standing ovation,35
TItis triumph did not mean complete success for the New Prontier. It only meant
that the entire House eould consider its proposal:'> and that the majority would rule.
The conservative coalition in the House went on to oppose and defeat many of
Kennedy's p.rograms, but during 1961 the performance of the Cummittee on Rules
go.:iVe Rayburn the desired results. Enlarged, it refused only one major Kennedy bill--a
school aid measure-passage to the floor.36
All this success Was largely the result of Rayburn's efforts. He wanted to see
Kennedy's New Prontier programs written into statutory law, and he was the only
man in the House 'With sufficient influence and power to engineer enlargement of the
Rules Committee. Without such an ally the New Frontier would have been doomed
from the outset,. and such legislation as it bmught would have been longer in cOIning. ..
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